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DIVORCE, UNDER THE INDIANA LAW, FOR
ABANDONMENT, CRUELTY OR FAILURE
TO PROVIDE
W. W. THORNTON
No divorce can be granted unless some statute empowers the
court to grant it for causes specified in the statute. This is
elementary, and obtains in every state.' If some statute does
not declare a divorce can be granted for a particular fault or
delinquency, none can be granted. Unchastity is one of these in-
stances in this state.2 Divorce cannot be granted merely because
both of the parties desire one.3 Thus where the defendant filed
a cross-complaint praying that he be granted a divorce, the
court said: "Nor does it matter that both have prayed a divorce.
Their concurrent wish or even consent will not justify a
divorce." 4 Nor can a divorce be granted to both the plaintiff
and to the defendant on his cross bill.5 In every divorce case the
state is a third party.6 This is true when an appeal is taken. 7
And the court in a way represents the state, especially when
there is no defense and the defendant does not appear. In that
capacity the court may examine the plaintiff, and should ascer-
tain if he is a fit person to receive a divorce, and if he has com-
mitted any marital offense; and if he has, refuse the divorce.3
1 Williams v. Williams, 136 Ky. 71, 123 S. W. 337; Umbash v. Umbach,
183 N. Y. App. Div. 495, 171 N. Y. Supp. 138.
2 Curry v. Curry, Wilson's Ind. Rep. 236; Eikenberry w. Eikenberry, 33
Ind. App. 69, 70 N. E. 837;
3 Scott v. Scott, 17 Ind. 309.
4 Gullett v. Gudlett, 25 Ind. 517; Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. .555,
38 N. E. 855.
G Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 38 N. E. 855 (case reversed).
See Scott v. Scott, 17 Ind. 303; Chistenberry v. Chistenberry, 3 Blackf. 202.
6 Geager v. Geager, 43 Ind. App. 313, 87 N. E. 144; Bacon v. Bacon, 43
Ind. App. 218, 86 N. E. 1030.
7 Edward v. Edward, 72 Ind. App. 638, 125 N. E. 460.
8 Eikenberry v. Eikenberry, 33 Ind. App. 69, 70 N. E. 837.
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"Public policy requires that there be no severance of the mari-
tal relations without adequate cause." 9 "Society and the state
are interested in upholding the marriage relation, and statutory
safeguards thrown around it will therefore be strictly insisted
upon. No divorce will be granted except in the cases provided
by law."' 0 A contract of marriage is not to be viewed by the
courts as an ordinary contract which the parties may at any time
agree to rescind. It cannot be dissolved because the parties to it
desire a dissolution; for the state, being a party to the contract
will not give its consent to its abrogation. It cannot be annulled
except in the manner provided by law."
The legislature gives no definition of the terms it uses when
it states for what causes divorces may be granted. Thus it does
not define the terms "abandonment" nor "cruel and inhuman
treatment," nor "reasonable provision" for the family. Inter-
pretation of those terms is left to the courts. Of the vast num-
ber of divorce cases tried, very few reach the upper courts; and
even there divided opinions occasionally occur. The tempers and
the points of view of our nisi prius judges are as varied as the
leaves of a tree. No two have exactly the same point of view of
a contested, or an uncontested, case in any one of the three causes
of divorce discussed in this article. Often a judge of easy-going
mentality will grant a divorce on one of these subjects when
another of more rigid views of divorce will refuse it; and each
one honestly endeavoring to reach a just result. This is well
illustrated in a case appealed to the Supreme Court. The trial
judge had called a jury to try the case, and it made a special
finding of the facts as shown by the evidence. Upon these find-
ings the court refused a divorce, but when appealed, the Supreme
Court reversed the case and directed the lower court to enter a
decree granting a divorce. The case was one of "cruelty and
abandonment."'12 This variance of views of judges is a subject
of study in Marion County where any one of six of its judges can
grant divorces; and it is quite common for one judge to have
many more divorce cases pending before him than before any of
the others; and yet each judge be equally informed upon the
law of divorce and equally honest in granting or refusing di-
vorces. Changes of venue are often taken on the ground of
9 Summers v. Summers, 179 Ind. 8, 13, 100 N. E. 71 (citing Barnett v.
Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737; Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412,
94 N. E. 564); Darmen v. Darmen, 38 Ind. App. 279, 78 N. E. 89.
10 Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 38 N. E. 855.
11 Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 38 N. E. 855.
12 Shores v. Shores, 23 Ind. 546.
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bias or prejudice of the trial judge in order to get the case before
an "easy-going" judge; either one of the regular judges or a
special one. And this is true frequently throughout the state
where a change of venue is taken in order to secure a special
judge who will view with more leniency the plaintiff's cause of
divorce or defense than the regular judge.
Prior to the divorce act of 1873 the divorce statute provided
that a divorce might be granted, after enumerating several causes
for divorce, for "any other cause for which the court shall deem
it proper that a divorce should be granted."'1  Where a judge
granted a divorce in accordance with this provision an appeal lay
to the Supreme Court, but there had to be an extreme abuse of
power in the court to secure the reversal of a case granting a
divorce. 14 No doubt the abuse of this power, even unintention-
ally, owing to the divergent views of nisi prius judges, led to its
omission in the act of 1873.
ACT OF MARCH 10, 1873.
The statute now in force provides that a divorce may be
granted for:
1. "Abandonment for two years";
2. "Cruel and inhuman treatment of either party by the
other";
3. "The failure of the husband to make reasonable provisions
for his family for a period of two years."'1
It is proposed to treat only these three causes for divorce, lim-
iting the discussion to Indiana cases, with a few exceptions.
There is such variance of the statutes of the several states in
prescribing causes for divorces for abandonment, cruel treat-
ment and failure to provide, that decisions in such states cannot
be implicity, even though with caution, relied upon. For that
reason, and for the reason that a discussion of foreign cases,
would tend to mislead and exceed the bounds of a paper of this
kind, few references are made to cases from other states. "A
divorce statute should not be construed in a spirit of improper
liberality, nor with a view to defeat its ends, yet it should be
construed strictly." But a party within its provisions should
be granted relief.16 And when a divorce might be granted before
1873 because the judge thought one should be granted, the S'u-
13 11, Gavin v. Hord, p. 81.
14 Ruby v. Ruby, 29 Ind. 174; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 34 Ind. 368; Gerner
v. Gerner, 38 Ind. 139; Gullett v. Gullett, 25 Ind. 517; Tefft v. Tefft, 35
Ind. 44.
15 Burns' R. S. 1926, Sec. 1095, Subdivisions 3, 4 and 6.
16 Eikenberry v. Eikenberry, 33 Ind. App. 69, 70 N. E. 837.
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preme Court said, "The statute has not invested our courts with
power to decree a divorce merely upon the notion that the parties
should be separated, for some undefined reason, for which neither
can legally claim a divorce against the others."'17
ABANDONMENT
The statute uses the word "abandonment"; but frequently in
the opinions of the courts the word "desertion" is inserted for
"abandonment". It is usually conceded that the two words are
synonomous. In other states the statutes frequently use the
word "desert" or "desertion" and not the word "abandonment".18
Abandonment under the divorce act is "the act of wilfully leaving
the wife [or husband] with the intention of causing a separation
between the parties, and implies an actual desertion of the wife
by the husband" (or the husband by the wife).19 In another
case it is said "Abandonment" is "the act of a husband or wife
who leaves his or her consort wilfully without justification * * *
or by reason of wrongful conduct of the other, and with inten-
tion of causing a perpetual separation of the parties." 20 Aban-
donment or desertion is a breach of the matrimonial duty and
consists of the actual breaking of the matrimonial cohabitation,
coupled with an intent to desert, in the mind of the offender.21
"According to the latest authorities, it may be laid down that
legal desertion [or abandonment] in the present sense of our
divorce acts, imparts three things: (1) An actual cessation of
cohabitation for the period specified; (2) the wilful intent of
the absent spouse to desert; (3) desertion by that spouse against
the will of the other. Unless these three things concur, there is
no legal desertion [or abandonment] established such as to jus-
tify a divorce in the petitioner's favor."22
Under these definitions it is quite clear that there can be no
abandonment where the parties mutually agree to separate, or
where the separation is with the tacit consent of the complaining
spouse. "If the separation is by mutual consent there is no
17 Gulett v. Gullett, 25 Ind. 517.
18 Carr v. Carr, 6 Ind. App. 377, 33 N. E. 805.
19 Stornbaugh v. Stornbaugh, 60 Ind. 275.
20 Hill v. Taylor, 186 Ind. 680, 683, 117 N. E. 930; Carr v. Carr, 6 Ind.
App. 377, 33 N. E. 805.
21 Crounse v. Crounse, 107 Gratt. Va. 108, 60 S. E. 627; Bailey 'v. Bailey,
21 Va. 43; Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S. E. 12; Sneed v. Sneed,
14 Ariz. 17, 123 Pac. 312, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 99.
22 Schouler on Husband and Wife, 516, quoted in Barnett v. Barnett, 27
Ind. 466, 61 N. E. 737.
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desertion by either party."2 3 "Desertion implies a want of con-
sent, on the part of the complaining spouse."-24 Notwithstanding
separation by mutual consent will not afford ground for a
divorce, yet it may in time become such an one as will authorize
the granting of a divorce. If one of the spouses in good faith re-
quests the other to return, or offers in good faith to return to the
other, and is met with a refusal in the first instance, to receive
him or her, or if, in compliance with the request to return, the
separation continues for two years, a divorce may be granted
for desertion to the party making a request for a return or
offering to return. But in such instance the two years will not
begin until the request or offer of a return is made. The offer
to return must be made in good faith with an intent to return,
and an intention to return must be kept in good faith during
the whole two years. And in the case of a request to return
the request must be made in good faith with an intent to receive
the other spouse and resume the marital relations; and that
intent must be continuous until the two-year period has expired.
No condition can be imposed in either instance. But there is
a limit to the last statement. The husband has a right to choose
the place of their residence. If he says, "I will receive you back
if you will go and live with me", at a designated place, then the
wife must accept the condition. Of course, it is possible that
the selection of the husband is such a one as renders it im-
possible for the wife to comply with the request; as, for instance,
in the heart of the wilds of Africa, or in case of a refined woman,
in the heart of the slums of a great city. Such an offer may be
construed as not made in good faith or with any expectation that
it would be accepted. It may be taken as proof of the husband's
intention never to receive his wife.
The conduct of a husband may be such as to drive his wife
away. A mere request to leave, while insulting and painful to
his wife, would not justify her leaving him. "If a husband drives
the wife from home by his cruelty, this, besides being the sta-
tutory cause of cruel and inhuman treatment, will constitute a
desertion on his part [not on her part]. When the cruelty to
the wife is carried to the extent that she is compelled thereby
to depart, it may be presumed that he intended such effect of
his cruelty. Where both are equally at fault in causing the sep-
23 Hill v. Taylor, 186 Ind. 680, 684, 117 N. E. 930 (citing Belles v. Belles,
50 Mich. 49, 14 N. W. 696; Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 49 Pa. St. 249, 88 Am.
Dec. 500; Hart v. McGrew, 11 AtI. (Pa.) 617; Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind.
App. 466, 61 N. E. 737.
24 Summers v. Summers, 179 Ind. 8, 100 N. E. 71 (citing Barnett V.
Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737).
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aration, neither can get a divorce on the ground of desertion."25
"To constitute a sufficient provocation for the departure of a
wife with the purpose of permanently separating herself from
her husband with a view to the dissolution of the marriage tie,
the actual cause of such conduct on her part should be something
which would be sufficient ground for a divorce. '2 6 When the
husband drives the wife away he is guilty of a constructive de-
sertion.27 Such misconduct, to justify the wife leaving her
husband must be such as in itself constitutes a ground for di-
vorce.28 "Nothing short of such conduct will justify a wilful
separation or continuance of it. * * * Separation is not to be
tolerated for light censure; and for slight causes which the law
does not recognize as grounds for a divorce". 29
What is true of the wife being driven from her husband's
home, is true of the husband where his wife's conduct is such as
to compel or justify his leaving her.30
"The refusal by the husband to follow his wife to a new res-
idence does not constitute abandonment ;"31 for he has the legal
right to choose the place of their residence; and it is her duty
to follow him, although the place is not agreeable to her. When
the abandonment has existed two years or over, and thereby a
cause of action has accrued to the abandoned spouse, such spouse
is not bound to receive back the other, and his or her cause of
action for a divorce cannot be then defeated by an offer of the
offending spouse to return.32 The cause of action cannot be thus
taken away or annulled. The offended party has a right to avail
himself of it.
The plaintiff must charge in the complaint that the defendant
"abandoned" her; it is not enough to say they "separated".
25 Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737.
26 Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737 (citing Oinson v.
Heritage, 45 Ind. 73, 15 Am. Rep. 258).
27 Summers v. Summers, 179 Ind. 8, 10, 100 N. E. 71 (citing many
cases).
28 Summers v. Summers, supra (citing Lynch v. Lynch, 33 Md. 328;
Weigand v. Weigand, 42 N. J. Eq. 699, 11 AtI. 113; Sower's Appeal, 88
Pa. St. 173).
29Alkin v. Alkin, 33 Wise. 517, 11 S. E. 11; Eshback v. Eshbacc, 23 Pa.
St. 343; Graves' Appeal, 37 Pa. St. 442; Crounse v. Crounse, 107 Va. 108,
60 S. E. 627; Martin v. Martin, 33 Wise. 695, 11 S. E. 121; Carr v. Carr,
22 Gratt. (Va.) 68.
so Summers v. Summers, 179 Ind. 8, 10, 100 N. E. 71 (citing many
cases).
31 Hill v. Taylor, 186 Ind. 680, 684, 117 N. E. 930 (citing Frost v. Frost,
17 N. H. 251).
82 Ruby v. Ruby, 29 Ind. 174.
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But to allege that the defendant "deserted" the plaintiff is
equivalent to a charge that he "abandoned" her. Nor is it too
general. 33 Of course the complaint must show that the aband-
onment had existed at least two years. But where if the com-
plaint alleged that the plaintiff and defendant were married and
lived together as husband and wife until a date given when the
defendant wholly abandoned the plaintiff, and they had not lived
together since, it was held sufficient where the complaint had
been filed more than two years after the given date of aban-
donment. 34 The complaint should state that the abandonment
had been continuous from the date it took place. If there was
more than one abandonment, then the date of the last one usually
must be the one relied upon; for a resumption of the marital
relations is a condonment of all prior instances of abandonment.
But a wilful abandonment may be such as to efface the condon-
ment and enable the plaintiff to rely upon a prior abandonment.
It is not necessary to have, as it is in some states, a request made
before bringing the suit for a resumption of the marital rela-
tions. That undoubtedly would be true where the abandonment
was occasioned by the cruel treatment of the defendant spouse.
It must be shown that the defendant abandoned the plaintiff
the required length of time to entitle him to divorce; and the bur-
den is on the plaintiff to make such a showing. It is not enough
to show a separation and that the defendant afterwards said
he did not intend to live again with the plaintiff.35 The fact of
desertion may be proved by a variety of circumstances leading
with more or less probability to that conclusion; "but the evi-
dence as a whole must be clear and convincing." In one case
the plaintiff testified to a system of quarrelsomeness and fault-
finding on the part of the husband, by reason of which she
felt constrained to leave his house. "I was afraid of my life,"
she said, "There was nothing in his conduct beyond coldness and
indifference and finding fault with everything I did. He never
struck me at any time." It was held that this did not show an
abandonment because of cruel conduct.37
CRUEL TREATMENT
More cases are brought upon the ground of "cruel and inhu-
man treatment" than upon any other-perhaps more than upon
83 Carr v. Carr, 6 Ind. App. 377, 33 N. E. 805.
34 Cummins v. Cummins, 30 Ind. App. 671, 66 N. E. 915.
35 McCoy v. McCoy, 3 Ind. 555.
38 Hill v. Taylor, 186 Ind. 680, 684, 117 N. E. 930.
37 Stanbaugh -v. Stanbaugh, 60 Ind. 275.
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all the other grounds for divorce. This subject is a prolific
source of divorces. And it is here where nisi prius judges
greatly differ as to what is and what is not cruel and inhuman
treatment when the border line is reached. The state reports
are full of cases on this subject; and to set forth a synopsis on
these cases would of itself make a small sized volume. Statutes
of the various states, too, differ in the language used granting
divorces for cruelty. Some of them are much more stringent
than the Indiana statutes; and occasionally is one more lenient.
In this article we cannot set out the facts in each Indiana case
showing what was or what was not cruel and inhuman treatment.
Each case must be examined for that. In one case our Supreme
Court, along the line of this section, said: "We quite agree
with counsel for appellant, that frequently our trial courts are
too liberal in granting decrees of divorce on the ground of cruel-
ty, and that public policy requires that the marital relation
shall not be severed, families disrupted, and innocent children
deprived of the companionship, counsel and affection of both
parents, without adequate cause."38
The statute provides for a divorce for "cruel and inhuman
treatment". 'Cruelty' is defined to mean to give pain, or tor-
ment, or vex or afflict, or cause grief or misery. 'Inhuman' is
.defined to mean, destitute of the kindness and tenderness that
belong to a human being. 39 A text writer of note has defined
"Cruelty" as "any conduct in one of the married parties which,
to the reasonable apprehension of the other, or in fact, renders
cohabitation physically unsafe, to a degree justifying a with-
drawal therefrom". 40 As facts in one case may constitute cruelty
and not in another, each case must be determined upon its own
facts in deciding whether the defendant was guilty of cruel and
inhuman treatment of the other spouse.41 In the former case it
was said, "What constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment must
be determined by the facts of the given case."
"Cruelty is a relative term; its exactness frequently depends
upon the character and refinement of the parties, and the con-
38 Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412, 417, 94 N. E. 864.
39 Graft v. Graft, 76 Ind. 136.
40 Bishop, on Marriage and Divorce, Sec. 1531. For an earlier definition
of Bishop, approved by our Supreme Court by quoting it, see Small v. Small,
57 Ind. 568; and for a criticism of this former definition, see Eastes v.
Eastes, 79 Ind., 371, as not being broad enough: "Anything that tends
to humiliate or annoy may as effectually endanger life and health as per-
sonal violence, and will afford ground for divorce." Zweig v. Zweig, 46
Ind. App. 94, 93 N. E. 234.
41 Massey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407, 80 N. E. 977, 81 N. E. 732.
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clusion to be reached in each case must depend upon the charac-
ter and refinement of the parties, and upon its own particular
facts." In determining what constitutes cruel and inhuman
treatment it will be determined by the facts of a given case, the
situation of the parties, their social standing and their morality
and refinement. 43
It should be observed that our statute requires both cruel and
inhumant treatment. If it granted divorces merely for "cruel
treatment" then the doors would be opened wide for all kinds
of cruelty, however little it might be. By the linking of that
word with inhuman, some attempt to limit it in its application
was made. Mere cruelty is not enough; it must be sufficient to
be "inhuman". This fact is sometimes lost sight of. From the
cases the inference may be deducted that the cruelty must be
sufficient to impair (not the comfort or happiness alone) the
health of the victim. Of course health may be impaired by
mere mental distress.
In all divorce proceedings for cruel and inhuman treatment
the character and refinement or non-refinement of the plaintiff
is a subject of inquiry or observation and consideration; and a
judge who fails to take this carefully into consideration will of-
ten make mistakes. The better judge he is of character, the
better knowledge he has of human character and conduct, the
better result he will reach in actions of this kind, and fewer
mistakes he will make. And it may be put down as a fact that
what is cruelty and inhuman treatment to one person is not to
another, because of their physical make up and difference in
mental character. All the cases tacitly or openly proceed upon
this theory.4 4 "We do not divorce savages and barbarians," said
the court in one case, "because they are such to each other. We
cannot exercise sound judgment in divorce cases without study-
ing the acts complained of in connection with the character of
the parties, and for this we want the common sense of the jury
rather than fixed legal rules." 45 "Among half-civilized and bru-
tal people, blows might be exchanged between married couples,
who, in the main are happy and have no desire to part. Nor
should a false and malicious charge of adultery be held, in all
42 Kelley v. Kelly, 18 N. W. 19, 1 Pac. 194, 51 Am Rep. 732, quoted in
Massey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407, 409, 80 N. E. 937, 81 N. E. 732;
Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412, 417, 94 N. E. 564.
43 Zweig v. Zweig, 46 Ind. App. 94, 93 N. E. 254.
44 Graft v. Graft, 76 Ind. 136, 138; Massey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407,
410, 80 N. E. 937, 81 N. E. 732.
45 Richards v. Richards, 37 Pa. St. 225, quoted in Massey v. Massey,
supra.
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cases, such cruel and inhuman treatment as would justify a
divorce. In all cases the character and condition of the parties
and their surroundings should be considered." 46 "The codnduct
of the husband in abusive language, treatment and demeanor to-
ward his wife might cause greater suffering to a refined and
gentle woman than an act of violence. Such conduct might
well be considered as cruel and inhuman treatment. The blows
thus inflicted may cause deeper anguish than physical injuries
to the person, more enduring and lacerating to the wounded
spirit of the gentle woman than actual violence to the person,
even though severe. It would make no difference to such a wo-
man whether she received a blow upon the head or the heart."47
To constitute "cruel and inhuman treatment" it is not neces-
sary to show physical violence and the like. Under the older au-
thorities that was necessary, and a divorce would not be granted
unless there was some actual violence, attended with damages
to health or life, or at least some reasonable apprehension of such
violence must first have been shown.48 That there can be cruel
and inhuman treatment without physical violence is now well
established.49 "Both a sound mind and a sound body are ne-
cessary to health. Therefore whatever threatens to and does
impair either or both, endangers life or health and constitutes
cause for divorce under our statute.' 50
Under this head can be found a number of cases, each vary-
ing in its scope and facts. Usually the accusation of adultery on
the part of the wife is accompanied by physical blows and like
conduct. But there are many cases where no physical contact
took place. The extent of the accusation is carried, and what
publicity is given to the charge is a matter of vital considera-
tion. All the cases I believe are instances where the accusation
was made in the presence of others; and none when it was made
only in the presence of the two spouses. Where a husband open-
ly accused, in the presence of others, his wife with having com-
mitted adultery, it was said: "A husband could hardly, by any
other means, cause a virtuous wife more mental pain, torment,
46 Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412, 417, 94 N. E. 864; Zweig V. Zweig
46 Ind. 94, 93 N. E. 234.
47Zweig v. Zweig, 46 Ind. App. 94, 93 N. E. 234. There may be a con-
stantly recurring form of cruelty that may be less tangible (than physical
violence) yet in its effect more deadly and extreme. Root v. Root, 164
Mich. 638, 130 N. W. 194, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837; Alberding v. Alberding,
107 La. 715, 31 So. 1038.
48 Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 102 N. E. 389.
49 Massey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407, 80 N. E. 977, 81 N. E. 732.
50 Zweig v. Zweig, 46 Ind. App. 594, 93 N. E. 234.
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vexation, affliction, grief and misery, than to falsely charge her
with the crime of adultery, and slanderously report the same
around among her neighbors; and in doing so he would be guil-
ty of a great unkindness and want of tenderness toward her. A
greater violation of the marital vow, to protect and defend the
reputation as well as the person, of a wife, the husband could
not commit, than to wantonly traduce and vilify her charac-
ter."5' 1 In passing upon another case the court said: "After
forty years of wedded life, after appellee had borne her husband
six children, there is flaunted in the face of a virtuous wife, in
the presence of her children, a charge likely to cause more actual
mental torture than any other which fiendish ingenuity might
devise. This is cruel and inhuman treatment within the mean-
ing of our statute, under the circumstances here shown."52
A charge of infidelity made by the wife against her husband
may be alleged by him in a petition for a divorce on the ground
of cruel treatment.53 A husband is entitled to a divorce for
cruelty inflicted upon him by his wife. The statute says "either"
party. 54
Will a single accusation of adultery in his wife by the husband
afford her sufficient cause for a divorce if constructed? There
is no case on this subject, as previously stated. Because of
the character of the wife or her mental sensitiveness it might
not be considered by her serious. And of course it would not
then be cruel treatment for her. The manner in which the
charge was made is of weight. If not made in the presence of
another that would be a matter to be considered. The charge,
to constitute a cause for divorce, must not only be false but ma-
liciously made. If the woman be one of culture and refinement,
of high social standing, and made with the belief that it is true,
I think it sufficient if made seriously, with belief of its truth-
fulness, even out of the presence of others, and of course much
51 Graft v. Graft, 76 Ind. 136, 138; Massey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407,
410, 80 N. E. 937, 81 N. E. 732; Edwards v. Edwards, 72 Ind. App. 638,
125 N. E. 468; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 109 N. E. 389;
Cooper v. Cooper, 51 Ind. App. 374, 99 N. E. 782; Morse v. Morse, 25 Ind.
156.
52 Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412, 418, 94 N. E. 564; Massey v. Massey,
supra; Zweig v. Zweig, 46 Ind. App. 94, 93 N. E. 234.
53 Massey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407, 410, 80 N. E. 937, 81 N. E. 732;
Day v. Day, 5 Alaska, 585. See also, Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412,
417, 44 N. E. 564. Especially when connected with other acts of cruelty.
Shores v. Shores, 23 Ind. 546. See Spitzmesser v. Spitzmesser, 26 Ind. App.
532, 60 N. E. 315.
54 Spitzmesser v. Spitzmesser, 26 Ind. App. 532, 60 N. E. 315; Massey v.
Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407, 80 N. E. 977, 81 N. E. 732.
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more so if repeated. Such a charge would likely drive from the
wife all love for her husband and greatly wound her feelings,
probably to the extent of impairing her health. Its effect, how-
ever, would be a subject for investigation at the trial. In all
cases such a charge could not be a cause for a divorce, as in the
case of an unrefined, course and sensual woman. She prob-
ably would retort with a like charge against her husband.5
Abandonment and failure to provide may be cruel treatment
sufficient to authorize the granting of a divorce. In this way
the proceeding for a divorce might be brought before the two
year period after the abandonment or failure to provide had
expired. 56 Thus when a husband within three years after his
marriage abandoned his wife and their infant child, left the
state, and without explanation, ceased all correspondence with
her, left her dependent upon her own labor and the charity of
friends for her support and that of her child, it was held that
he was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment of his wife. "To
a sensitive spirited woman such treatment would be more cruel
and inhuman than the infliction of corporal punishment and se-
vere injuries to her; for mental suffering and public shame and
disgrace are more difficult to be borne then mere physical pain."57
But this rule may be pushed too far. Whether or not the aban-
doning of the wife by the husband can be treated as cruel and
inhuman treatment depends upon the particular facts of each
case. He may leave her in such condition she can readily ob-
tain support. If she have no child to support, it would have to be
a very strong case to enable her to secure a divorce for cruelty.
But suppose she was ill, abed, so much so as to be unable to live,
without food and fire in the house and without friends and ac-
quaintances, then a very different case would be involved, es-
pecially if she lay unattended for some days. It certainly would
be cruel and inhuman treatment.
Where a husband brings suit against his wife on the ground
of cruel and inhuman treatment, he must go farther than if she
were to bring one. "He must make out a clear case."5 8 If no
55 See Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 412, 417, 94 N. E. 564. "Nor should
a false and malicious charge of adultery be held in all cases such cruel and
inhuman treatment as would justify a divorce. * * * 'Cruel and in-
human treatment', one of the statutory causes for divorce in Indiana, is,
like negligence, a relative term and of necessity must depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case." Ibid 417.
56 Eastes v. Eastes, 79 Ind. 363.
57 Eastes v. Eastes, 79 Ind. 363, at 370.
5s Aurand v. Aurand, 157 Ill. 321, 41 N. E. 859; Foster v. Foster, 79
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acts of violence be charged, "it must clearly appear from the
facts in the case that the acts of the wife have rendered the con-
tinuance of the marital relation so intolerable to the husband as
to endanger his physical well being." 59 He must clearly show
that his own deportment did not contribute to the wrong he
complains of.6o
If a husband communicate to his wife a loathsome sexual di-
sease-even though he had contracted the disease before their
marriage, and the communication was shortly thereafter, she
may abandon him and secure a divorce on the ground of cruel
treatment. In one case it was said: "His conduct was not only
vile, but it was infamous. It was bad enough for him to violate
his marital vows, but when followed by infecting the wife with a
loathsome disease, the depth of infamy had been sounded. The
law does not require that the wife shall abuse herself to the ex-
tent of condoning the adulterous conduct of the husband; much
less is she required to jeopardize her health and life in order
that she may receive food, raiment and shelter from his in-
iquitous hand. She is entitled to enjoy his good fortunes and
bound to share his misfortunes, but she is not required to share
his ignominy and shame, or to imperil her life and health on
account of his wrong."61 In aid of the necessary proofs of
knowledge the presumption is that he was aware of his own
diseased condition and danger of infection. 62
Mere cold neglect may be cruel and inhuman treatment.
"Conduct which produces perpetual social sorrow, although phy-
sical food be not withheld, may be classed as cruel and entitle
the sufferer to relief." 63  Unwarranted and unjustifiable con-
duct may be sufficient.64 Thus in a complaint it was alleged that
the husband for more than two years had refused to speak to
his wife, that he refuse to visit their neighbors with her, and
did not permit them to visit her, was held to state a cause for a
divorce. 5 On due showing that the defendant husband had
Ind. App. 345, 138 N. E. 360. See also, De La Hey v. De La Hey, 21 IIl.
251, and Doyle v. Doyle, 26 Mo. 545.
5S9 Aassey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 410, 80 N. E. 937 (distinguishing
McAllister v. McAllister, 71 Texas 695, 10 S. W. 294).
60 Foster v. Foster, 79 Ind. App. 345, 138 N. E. 360.
61 Carr v. Carr, 6 Ind. App. 377.
62Porter v. Caylor, 146 Ind. 448, 46 N. E. 648; Bishop on Marriage and
Divorce, Sec. 735.
63 Rice v. Rice, 6 Ind. 100, quoted in Massey v. Massey, 40 Ind. App. 407,
at 410.
64 Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 102 N. E. 389.
65 Zweig v. Zweig, 46 Ind. App. 594, 93 N. E. 234, quoting Banner v.
Banner, 96 Calif. 171, 30 Pac. 298, 16 L. R. A. 660.
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accused plaintiff of stealing his money, witli having sexual in-
tercourse with his son, with adultery with other men; that he
called her a liar and applied vulgar epithets to her, that he tor-
mented her and made cruel remarks concerning her physical
appearance; that he often would not speak to her for a period
of two weeks, except to quarrel with her, and that he told her
a number of times that he would be the happiest man on earth
when he got rid of her, it was held that a divorce had been prop-
erly granted her.66
Refusal to have intercourse with her husband is not sufficient
for a divorce, even though made without cause and though he
desire children ;67 unless, at least there is no showing that there
was good cause for such refusal.68
A mutual or non-mutual separation followed by offer of the
plaintiff to resume the marriage relation and a refusal on the
part of the defendant cannot be construed as cruel treatment.69
A groundless prosecution of the husband by the wife for an
alleged crime, resulting in his trial and acquittal, is not "cruel
and inhuman treatment" within the meaning of the statute.1 0
Refusal of the wife to join in a conveyance of the husband's lands
is not cruel treatment. This she had a right to do. 7 ' If the wife
attacks the husband physically, compelling him to defend him-
self or suffer serious injury in all likelihood, then in his de-
fence, striking her is not cruel treatment, if not carried to an
extreme.1
2
Quarrels and disagreements are not cruel treatment, such as
will warrant the granting of a divorce.1 3 Neither uncontrolabil-
ity of temper nor the many misunderstandings and bickerings
which are characteristic of the marriage relation in a consider-
able percentage of cases are grounds for divorce; "and those
who have married must bear the real and principal burdens they
have assumed, unless the conduct of the one entitles the other,
66 Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 102 N. E. 389.
67 Pinnebad v. Pinnebad, 134 Ga. 496, 68 S. E. 73; Stewart v. Stewart,
78 Me. 548, 7 Atl. 473, 58 Am. Rep. 822; Cowles v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 298;
Burton v. Burton, 52 N. J. Eq. 215, 27 AtI. 825.
68 Foster v. Foster, 79 Ind. App. 345, 138 N. E. 360.
69 Ruby v. Ruby, 29 Ind. 174; Alkin v. Alkin, 33 W. Va. 517, 11 S. E. 11;
Eshback v. Eshback, 23 Pa. St. 343; Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11
S. E. 12.
70 Small v. Small, 57 Ind. 568.
71 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 40 Ind. App. 476, 82 N. E. 477.
72 Coleman v. Coleman, 143 Ind. 172, 43 N. E. 470.
73Sneed v. Sneed, 14 Ariz. 17, 122 Pac. 312; Connor v. Connor, 107 La.
453, 31 So. 766; Graff v. Graff, 136 La. 750, 67 So. 817; Burns v. Burns, 173
Ky. 105, 190 S. W. 683.
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that other being without fault, to the severance of the rela-
tion for one or the other of the statutory causes. ' ' 74 "The law
does not permit courts to sever the marriage bond and to break
up households, merely because parties, from unruly tempers
or mutual neglect, live unhappily together. It requires them to
submit to the ordinary consequences of human infirmities. '75
Violence committed during a quarrel, in which the husband suf-
fers as well as his wife, is not such cruelty as will sustain a di-
vorce against him.7 6 "A contract of marriage is not to be re-
scinded by the courts as an ordinary contract which the parties
may at any time agree to rescind. Neither can the court itself
on learning that the parties have had petty quarrels, and have
scolded and called one another hard names, come to the conclu-
sion that they would be better apart. Before a divorce can be
granted there must be found an injured party and a guilty party.
Society and the state are interested in upholding the marriage
relation, and the statutory safeguards thrown around it will
therefore be strictly insisted upon. No divorce will be granted
except in the manner provided by law." 77
A complaint must come within the terms of cruel and inhuman
treatment; but one which alleges that for several years her hus-
band struck, kicked and choked the plaintiff is sufficient.78 If
it charges both cruel treatment and abandonment the plaintiff
is not required to prove both to secure a divorce. One is suf-
ficient.
FAILURE TO SUPPORT
The statute authorizes the granting of a divorce for the "fail-
ure of the husband to make reasonable provision for his fam-
ily for a period of two years."8 0
74 Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 638, 130 N. W. 194, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837.
7r Cooper v. Cooper, 17 Mich. 205, 97 Am. Dec. 182 (Judge Cooley);
Rose v. Rose, 50 Mich. 92; Johnson v. Johnson, 49 Mich. 640. See also,
Darmen v. Darmen, 38 Ind. App. 279, 78 N. E. 892; Alexander v. Alexander,
140 Ind. 555, 38 N. E. 855; Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E.
737.
76 Seper v. Seper, 29 Mich. 308; Cooper v. Cooper, 10 La. 249.
77 Alexander v. Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 38 N. E. 855; Darmen v. Dar-
men, 38 Ind. App. 279, 78 N. E. 89. "The courts cannot encourage any
inclination or tendency to regard the obligation of wifehood and motherhood
as insufferably irksome." Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E.
737.
78 Mercer v. Mercer, 114 Ind. 558, 17 N. E. 182.
79 Skinner v. Skinner, 47 Ind. 670, 95 N. E. 128.
On appeal, when attacked for the first time, it will be held sufficient if it
will bar another action; Summers v. Summers, 179 Ind. 8, 13, 100 N. E. 71;
Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 102 N. E. 389.
so Burns' R. S. 1926, Sec. 1926, Sub. Div. 6.
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The fifth statutory cause for divorce in the original Act reads
"Habitual drunkenness of either party, or the failure of the hus-
band to make reasonable provision for his family." Under this
clause no length of time for a failure to support is stated. This
clause was omitted by the commissioners in the Revised Statutes
of 1881; and it has been omitted in every revision since then,
except that of 1897. If it is in force then the sixth clause is
useless. In practice it is usually treated as repealed by this
sixth clause, the latter being the last expression of the legisla-
ture. In but one case is this omitted clause repeated, and there
only a reference is made to it.81 I think there is no doubt but
what it is repealed.
If a wife abandons her husband or refuses to live with him,
then he is not bound to support her.8 2 He is not required to
support her at any other place than his home;8 3 but if he re-
fuses to receive her back after she has gone away he will come
within the provision of the statute.8 4 But where a husband and
wife mutually agreed to and did separate, and he contributed
nothing to her support, even during her illness following an oper-
ation, it was held that she was entitled to a divorce.8 5 Where a
wife left her husband's home because he could not support her;
and afterwards on his getting into better financial condition, he
requested her to return, and she refused, not intending to renew
the marital relations, it was held that the requisite time having
expired after the refusal he was entitled to a divorce. But this
was upon the ground of abandonment.86 If the parties mutually
agree to and do separate, then a request by the wife for support
is necessary before he will be charged with failure to provide.8 7
Where a husband had practically no property, home nor money,
when he married, and his wife was living with her widowed
mother on a farm; and during the six weeks in which they
sustained the relation of husband and wife they lived at the
home of the mother, wherefrom he left his wife, saying that he
was going to bring suit for a divorce, and soon thereafter
brought suit against the mother for damages for causing a sep-
8l Eastes v. Eastes, 79 Ind. 363, 370.
82 Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 446, 61 N. E. 737; Fuller V. Fuller,
108 Ga. 256, 33 S. E. 865.
83 Fowler v. Fowler, 138 Ky. 326, 127 S. W. 1014.
84 Wendling v. Wendling, 134 N. Y. Supp. 55.
85 Stevenson v. Stevenson (Utah), 190 Pac. 776; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt,
14 Vt. 561. See Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N, E. 737.
s6 Freeman v. Freeman, 94 Mo. App. 504, 68 S. W. 389.
87 Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App. 466, 61 N. E. 737 (citing 0inson v.
Heritage, 45 Ind. 73, 15 Am. Rep. 288).
DIVORCE UNDER THE INDIANA LAW
aration; and he wrote a letter to his wife asking her to leave
her mother and come to him, but did not offer to furnish her
means to come to him, nor provide for her support, which con-
dition existed for the statutory period, it was held that she was
entitled to a divorce on the ground of a failure to support.88
The statute contemplates that a husband, before he can be
charged with failure to provide for his family, must be able
to make reasonable provision for them. Thus an insane husband
cannot be charged with failure to support s9 though his estate
may be for her support. If a husband be without property and
is so sick as not to be able to earn wages, then he cannot be
charged with failure to support, under the statute. The statute
does not require of him the impossible. It is frequently a ques-
tion to what extent a husband must make provision for his fam-
ily. The statute says "reasonable provision". In a Michigan
case it is said "The husband being of sufficient ability, is bound
to afford to his wife support reasonably consistent with his own
means and station."90  If a husband be a man of average in-
dustry and economy earning what he has and devoting it to the
support of his family, that is all that is required of him; and
if he does that he cannot be charged with failure to make rea-
sonable support for his family; and the fact that the wife used
her own funds to assist in such support does not entitle her to
a divorce.91 The poverty or straightened circumstances of the
husband which are the result of misfortune or temporary in-
ability to secure employment even if it entails hardships upon
the wife, which he shares, is not grounds for divorce.9 2 The
wife is not entitled to a divorce merely because she is not sup-
ported to the extent and in the style in which she was support-
ed by her father before marriage.
It must be kept in mind that the earnings of a wife in this
state belong to the husband and not to the wife. It has been held
in some states that if the wife wishes to enter commercial em-
ployment or earn money in other ways, and thus earn sufficient
money for her support, then the husband cannot be charged
with failure to make reasonable provision for her.93 But she
is not bound to enter into employment for her own support; it
88 Turner v. Turner, 26 Ind. App. 677, 60 N. E. 718.
89 Baker v. Baker, 82 Ind. 46.
90 Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 638, 170 N. W. 194, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837.
91 Fowler v. Fowler, 138 Ky. 326, 127 S. W. 101.
92 Stevenson v. Stevenson (Fla.), 94 So. 860.
93 Hansen v. Hansen, 27 Cal. App. 401, 150 Pac. 70. See Locke v. Locke,
153, Cal. 50, 94 Pac. 244; Branch v. Branch, 30 Colo. 429, 71 Pac. 632;
Washburn v. Washburn, 9 Cal. 475; Rycroft v. Rycroft, 42 Cal. 444.
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is voluntary with her. The rule given above obtains in the
states where the law of community property prevails. But it
does not obtain in all states. Thus in a case in Washington it
was said:
"It is the duty of a husband to support his wife while living with her
and he cannot absolve himself from that duty by deserting her without
cause. The failure of the husband to make suitable provision for his family
is made a cause for divorce by the statute. The duty of the husband to
support the wife is a continual one, operating upon him from day to day,
and when he has violated that duty for a sufficient length of time to show
a settled purpose to disregard it, the wife may have the marriage relations
dissolved. The findings show a wilful breach of duty on the part of the
husband, dispite his ability to discharge that duty. His conduct is no less
reprehensible because the wife refused to work and maintain herself. He
has broken the bond and the statute provides the measure of relief."94
In actions for support it is no defense that the wife has prop-
erty of her own sufficient to support her. "The duty which the
law imposes upon the husband to support his wife is absolute and
not dependent upon her ability to support herself by her own
labor or out of her own property." 95
A failure of a husband to provide reasonable means of sup-
port for his family must be without just cause, if the wife is to
obtain a divorce on this ground.96 That a husband does not give
his wife money is not a failure to support.97 If the wife knows
her husband has credit at a store and knows that she can go
there to get things on his credit which are necessary for her and
the family's support, then she cannot successfully charge that
he failed to support her. It is sufficient that he provided the
94 Merriam v. Merriam, 75 Wash. 389, 134 Pac. 1058. In actions for
support it is no defense that the wife has property of her own sufficient to
support her. "The duty which the law imposes upon the husband to sup-
port his wife is absolute, and not dependent upon her ability to support
herself by her own labor or out of her own property." Stephens v. Stephens,
102 Minn. 301, 113 N. W. 913; White v. White, 50 Ill. App. 149. See
Austin v. Austin, 42 Colo. 130, 94 Pac. 309 (wife's means inadequate).
In California if the wife have ample means for her support from her
own property, and the husband's earning capacity and resources is not great,
she is not entitled to divorce on the ground of failure to support. Baker V.
Baker, 168 Cal. 346, 143 Pac. 607, Ann. Cases 1916A, 854.
95 Svanda v. Svanda, 93 Neb. 404, 140 N. W. 777, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.)
666; Gallotly v. Gallotly, 185 Mich. 382, 151 N. W. 1057; Bower v. Bower,
179 Mich.-146 N. W. 271, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 460; Taylor v. Taylor
20 N. M. 13, 145 Pac. 1075; Garland v. Garland, 66 Wash. 226, 119 Pac.
386; Uhler v. Uhler, 128 N. Y. Supp. 963; Dashbeek v. Dashbeck, 62 Mich.
322; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 14 Vt. 561.
96 Donley v. Donley, 150 Mo. App. 660, 131 S. W. 356.
97 Sailard v. Sailard, 2 Tenn. Ct. App. 396.
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means whereby she could get support.98 Failure to provide the
wife with necessary medical treatment may be a failure to sup-
port.9 9 As has been seen elsewhere, failure to provide for the
wife may under extreme circumstances be held to be cruel treat-
ment. 00
CONDONATION
The doctrine of condonation is applicable to instances of cruel
treatment."" It is conditioned that it will cease and upon its
repetition the former wrongs are revived.' 0 2 Usually it will be
presumed from proof of cohabitation ;103 but proof in cases of
cruelty will not be inferred from proof of a single act of inter-
course. 0 4
The plaintiff must come into divorce court, just as in a
court of equity, with "clean hands". "Divorce laws are made to
give relief to the innocent, not to the guilty."'1 5  If the plain-
tiff has been guilty of such conduct as would entitle the defen-
dant to a divorce, then he must fail. 6 Thus a plaintiff guilty
of adultery is not entitled to a divorce on the ground of abandon-
ment. 117 It is the duty of the court to examine the plaintiff on
this subject, in the absence of a defense at least; and it may do
so when a defense is being made.
Where the custody of a child was involved in an action, the
introduction in evidence by the husband of evidence falsely
charging the wife, the husband not knowing it was true, with
having committed adultery, and was not fit to have custody of
the child, it was held such conduct barred the husband from
obtaining a divorce.' 08 This would be true where he sought a
9S Mercer v. Mercer, 114 Ind. 558, 17 N. E. 182.
90 Eastes v. Eastes, 79 Ind. 367.
100 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 34 Ind. 368; Clogne v. Clogne, 46 Minn. 462;
Dunn v. Dun . 36 Neb. 141.
101 Rose v. Rose, 87 Ind. 481.
102 Wolverton v. Wolverton, 163 Ind. 26, 71 N. E. 123.
103 Wolverton v. Wolverton, supra; Phillips v. Phillips, 1 Ill. App. 245;
Cox v. Cox, I S. W., supra (N. Y.) 223; Doe v. Doe, 52 Hun 405.
104 Hoff v. Hoff, 48 Mich. 281, 12 N. W. 160.
105 Edward v. Edward, 72 Ind. App. 638, 25 N. E. 468; Christenberry v.
Christenberry, 3 Blackf. 202 (adultery in plaintiff before the passing of the
present statute).
100 Eikenberry v. Eikenberry, 33 Ind. 69, 70 N. E. 837 (a very lucid
decision on the question).
107 Edward v. Edward, 72 Ind. App. 638, 125 N. E. 468.
108 Ibid. On the general question, see Wheeler v. Wheeler, 18 Ore. 261,
24 Pac. 900; Beckley v. Beckley, 23 Ore. 226, 210 Pac. 470; Morrison v.
Morrison, 64 Mich. 53, 30 N. W. 903; Church v. Church, 16 R. I. 668, '7
L. R. A. 385.
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divorce by a cross-bill filed in her action for a divorce. The
falsity of such a charge would be his right to a divorce in the
event she failed. 0 9
It must be alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff and de-
fendant are separated" o and proven. Sometimes the parties,
though proceedings be pending between them for a divorce,
continue to remain in the same dwelling house which they in-
habited before proceedings were begun, but not cohabitating.
"Ordinarily the dwelling together of husband and wife under
one roof would authorize the presumption that all marital rela-
tions exist, but the presumption must give way to direct proof
that they had not lived and cohabitated together as man and
wife" before the bringing of suit for divorce nor at any time
since then. 112
1o9 Burns v. Burns, 60 Ind. 289.
110 Bruner v. Bruner, 192 Ind. 479, 35 N. E. 578.
111 Bruner v. Bruner, supra; Dennison v. Dennison, 4 Wash. 705, 30
Pac. 100.
